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1. Introduction 
Countries adopt technical regulations, including safety and performance 
requirements, to ensure consumer safety and product quality. However, these regulations 
can constitute barriers to trade by imposing compliance costs on firms. A great deal of 
research has focused on the effects of regulations on producer performance in export and 
production in agricultural sectors. The majority of these studies have found that safety 
requirements tend to reduce exports, particularly in developing countries (see, for example, 
Otsuki et al. (2001)). Research on the effects of technical regulations on manufacturing 
exports, however, has been limited. Chen et al. (2008) used firm-level survey data to 
examine the effects of quality, safety standards, and labeling requirements on the export 
performance of manufacturing firms in 16 developing countries. Using the same dataset, 
Maskus et al. (2013) investigated the effects of technical regulations on firm-level 
production cost. The results of these studies generally imply that technical regulations can 
increase exports even though they increase the fixed and variable costs of production. 
While the dataset used in these studies covers a global set of developing countries, it does 
not include East Asian countries. In addition, the number of samples for individual 
countries is not large enough to conduct detailed analysis of a single country. 
In this study, we use a new survey dataset to examine the effects of technical 
regulations on the performance of manufacturing firms in Malaysia and Vietnam with 
respect to both export and production. This study focuses on two sets of technical 
regulations targeting consumer and environmental safety in the EU: the Restriction of 
Hazardous Substances (RoHS) Directive and the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation 
and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH). The EU RoHS Directive (Directive of the 
European Parliament and the Council on restriction of the use of certain hazardous 
substances in electrical and electronic equipment) took effect in 20061. This directive 
restricts the amount of hazardous substances allowed in electronic and electrical (E&E) 
equipment. The EU REACH Regulation (Regulation of the European Parliament and 
                                                 
1  The regulated substances are lead, mercury, cadmium, polybrominated biphenyls, and polybrominated 
diphenyl ethers. 
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Council concerning Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals) 
entered into force in 2007 and regulates the use in products of chemical substances that 
cause serious concern for consumer health and the environment. Under REACH, if a 
product contains chemicals classified as SVHCs (Substances of Very High Concern) in 
excess of 0.1% by weight, firms are required to apply to the European Chemicals Agency 
for authorization.  
The survey of firms in a wide range of industries in Malaysia and Vietnam 
conducted by Institute of Developing Economies allows us to investigate the role of the 
supply chain in promoting compliance with technical regulations in the export markets. 
East Asia is a region where international production networks are among the world’s most 
sophisticated, as many studies have demonstrated (see, for example, Ando and Kimura 
(2005)). Compliance with technical regulations is likely to be encouraged when a 
downstream buyer makes requests for upstream supplies, and this supply chain 
management tends to work effectively for firms along the entire chain. For example, Koh et 
al. (2012) demonstrated the mechanism by which supply chain management encourages 
upstream suppliers to comply with safety requirements such as the EU’s Waste Electrical 
and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) and RoHS.  
Once the chemicals contained in a final product are regulated, the materials, parts 
and components that make up the final product must be redesigned, monitored, tested and 
shown to meet the stipulated chemical thresholds. Because parts and components suppliers 
are often located across borders, management of supply chains, value chains, and 
production networks takes place across firms, industries, and countries. To add to this 
complexity, product-related environmental regulations of chemicals impact various 
industries. Industries affected by REACH and RoHS include not only the chemical industry, 
but also the textiles, garment, wood products, plastic, rubber, machinery, and E&E 
industries, among others. Potentially affected industries are often located in developing 
countries, with those aiming at export to EU markets most affected.  
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Malaysia and Vietnam are rapidly industrializing countries in East Asia, and 
manufacturing exports have become an increasingly important engine of export-led growth 
for these countries. At the same time, these countries have faced increasing pressure from 
importing countries, particularly from developed countries and downstream buyers in the 
region, to meet safety and quality requirements. Although RoHS and REACH are only EU 
requirements, meeting those requirements can also signal superior safety and quality. 
Compliance with these standards may therefore help a firm enter non-EU markets. Our 
study aims to provide a complete picture of the effects of these regulations on the export 
performance and cost effectiveness of firms. Although production costs may increase, 
exports may do so as well. The empirical results will allow us to determine whether these 
requirements have a positive or negative net effect on firms by assessing which effect is 
dominant. This study also attempts to examine how global value chains promote 
compliance with those regulations. In particular, we are interested in whether non-exporting 
firms or upstream suppliers are also encouraged to comply with those regulations if they are 
a part of a global value chain. 
In the production analysis, we evaluate an increase in variable costs due to RoHS 
and REACH compliance by using an estimation of a translog cost function according to 
Maskus et al. (2013). For the export analysis, we employ a probit model to examine the 
effect of RoHS and REACH on firm entry into the export market. We also employ an 
ordered probit model to examine the effects of the regulations on the number of export 
markets that firms enter. We also analyze the effect on average exports per market for firms 
by using a sample selection model. In both the cost and export analyses, we use 
instrumental variables for RoHS/REACH because compliance with these regulations may 
be an endogenous choice made simultaneously with production or export decisions. These 
analyses rely on instrumental variables for the RoHS and REACH variable in order to deal 
with a possible causality between a firm’s compliance with the regulations and their 
production and export decisions. Finally, we conduct an analysis of the effect of global 
value chains by using a probit estimation.  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
backgrounds of Malaysia and Vietnam in terms of export performance and technical 
regulations. Section 3 explains the empirical approaches used in our analyses. Section 4 
describes the data used for the empirical analyses. Section 5 presents and interprets the 
results of the cost and export analyses. Section 6 presents and interprets the results of the 
analysis of global value chains. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Background 
2.1 Export performance of Malaysia and Vietnam 
Exports of goods from Malaysia and Vietnam have grown rapidly during the past 
two decades, as shown in Figures 1 and 2. Malaysia has been a World Trade Organization 
(WTO) member since 1995, and Vietnam joined the WTO in 2007. Although Malaysia is a 
larger exporter than Vietnam, exports from both countries have been increasing rapidly. 
This is especially true for manufactured goods, where growth has been higher than that of 
exports of agricultural products. Figure 2 shows the positive impact of WTO membership 
on Vietnam’s exports. In both figures, we can see the recovery from the global financial 
crisis and continued increases in exports. Our data show that 70% and 74% of the sampled 
firms in Malaysia and Vietnam, respectively, exported their products. 
Vu et al. (2014) found rapid growth in the number of both domestic firms and 
multinational enterprises in Vietnam since 2000. Also, increased foreign direct investment 
and export has led to greater pressure on firms in Malaysia and Vietnam to comply with 
safety and quality regulations. After the introduction of the RoHS Directive, a growing 
number of countries have implemented their own versions of the RoHS standards. Vietnam 
introduced its version of RoHS in September 2011, and Malaysia also has a long history of 
regulating hazardous chemicals. Thus, we can infer that firms in Malaysia and Vietnam are 
quite aware of the importance of regulations on hazardous chemicals. Among respondent 
firms in Malaysian and Vietnam, 81% and 88%, respectively, had achieved compliance 
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with RoHS by 2011; additionally, 70% in Malaysia and 87% in Vietnam had achieved 
compliance with REACH by 2011.  
 
2.2 Related literature 
Producers in developing countries face capacity constraints when complying with 
food safety and quality standards, which are typically imposed by developed countries. The 
significance of this is still unclear since firm-level quantitative studies on technical 
regulations are very limited, with research on developing countries being especially scarce.  
On the other hand, country-level empirical studies that examine the effects of 
technical regulations on trade are relatively abundant, particularly in the food and 
agricultural sectors. Otsuki et al. (2001a) used a gravity model to show that the EU’s 
aflatoxin standards discouraged African groundnut exports to the EU. A majority of studies 
of this kind have found negative effects of food safety standards (see, for example, Otsuki 
et al. (2001a), Wilson et al. (2003), Chen et al. (2008), Drogué and DeMaria (2012), and 
Winchester et al. (2012)). Honda (2012) is one of the few studies focusing on the 
manufacturing sector. He applied a gravity model to examine the effects of the EU’s RoHS 
on exports to the EU market from EU and non-EU countries, finding that RoHS promoted 
intra-EU trade, but discouraged exports from non-EU countries. Unlike the other country-
level studies, Xiong and Beghin (2013) attempted to isolate the positive demand-enhancing 
effect of food safety standards from the negative trade-cost effect using a more 
sophisticated gravity model.  
In contrast, there have been relatively few firm-level studies. Wilson and Otsuki 
(2004) tried to use the World Bank’s Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Survey Database to 
describe the benefits and difficulties that technical regulations bring to firms in developing 
countries. They showed that in 17 developing countries, approximately 70 percent of the 
surveyed firms across various industries claimed that the costs of testing and certification 
were likely to prevent them from exporting to major developed country markets. At the 
same time, approximately 80 percent of the surveyed firms responded that the assurance of 
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product quality and safety was important for expanding their exports. The firms tried to 
comply with the technical regulations in various ways: by expanding their plants or 
equipment, by re-designing products, and by hiring labor for production and testing.  
Using the above-mentioned database, Maskus et al. (2013) and Chen et al. (2008) 
developed methodological techniques for using firm-level data to analyze the effect of 
technical requisitions. Using a translog cost function, Maskus et al. (2013) conducted an 
estimation to see whether the presence of technical regulations would increase a firms’ 
recurring variable production costs in addition to the initial setup costs. Chen et al. (2008) 
estimated firm-level export functions of intensive and extensive margins. They identified 
the factors that increase the amount of exports in a firm’s total sales (intensive margin), and 
the number of export markets and products that are exported (extensive margin). 
Compliance with quality standards was found to increase not only the amount of exports, 
but also the number of export markets and products exported. In contrast, standard 
certification procedures were found to reduce the number of export markets and products 
exported. 
Ragasa et al. (2011) also found support for the cost-increasing effect of technical 
regulations, noting that the US HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points) 
standard imposed significant additional production costs on firms in the seafood industry in 
the Philippines. Several studies support the demand-enhancing effect of compliance with 
technical regulations. Maertens and Swinnen (2008) pointed out that developed countries’ 
stringent food safety standards do not always discourage developing country firms. 
Maertens and Swinnen (2009), and Maertens et al. (2011) demonstrated through a case 
study of Senegal’s fresh and processed fruits and vegetables industry that compliance with 
food safety standards in developed countries can increase developing country exports to 
developed countries which appreciate high-quality products. Maertens et al. (2011) also 
pointed out the importance of the role of multinational enterprises in improving product 
quality and safety as leaders in the supply chain of food products. Fontagné et al. (2013) 
examined the effects of sanitary and phytosanitary standards on firm’s probability to export 
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(extensive margin), value of exports (intensive margin) and export prices using firm-level 
data for French agricultural and manufacturing firms.  
 
3. Empirical strategy 
3.1. Production analysis  
Compliance with technical regulations imposes various costs on firms. Maskus et al. 
(2013) distinguished between the initial setup costs and the running or variable costs of 
complying with technical regulations. Although firms can be asked directly about their 
initial setup costs, they often cannot give an exact amount, especially if many years have 
passed since they first complied with the regulations. The additional running costs 
associated with regulations affect the consistency and amount of exports because these 
costs reduce profit margins. We therefore follow the approach of Maskus et al. (2013) for 
cost function estimation and use a translog cost function, which is flexible and can 
incorporate non-price variables such as factors for technical regulations.  
 Assume a short-run cost function 
  ),;,( zsywCC  ,       (1) 
where w is a vector of factor prices, y is output, s indicates the stringency of the foreign 
standards, and z is a vector of other variables affecting firm-level costs. The firm minimizes 
variable costs wx, where x is a vector of variable inputs. The cost function is assumed to 
have some standard properties: non-decreasing on w and y, concave on w, and 
homogeneous of degree one with respect to w. This general cost function has a variable for 
technical regulations, s, as an argument because different technical regulations should 
affect the choice of inputs for producing a given output level. Maskus et al. (2013) used 
initial setup costs for technical regulations as a measure of the stringency of technical 
regulations, but we use a dummy variable indicating compliance with RoHS or REACH 
because of a lack of data about the setup costs associated with these regulations.  
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We assume that the cost function is weakly separable from the aggregator for 
material inputs and other inputs (separability). The separability assumption is necessary 
because we do not have data on the prices of materials and other inputs. We therefore 
specify equation (1) as the cost of producing net output, or value added, introducing only 
labor and capital as variable inputs, obtaining weak separability in this instance. This 
implies that the choice of the relative labor and capital inputs is independent of the material 
and intermediate input prices.2 As a result, the cost function that reflects this technology is 
rewritten as 
)),;,(),,;,((),;,( 2211 zswyCzswyCzsywC  ,     (2) 
where ),{1 KL www   and 2w is the vector of prices for variable inputs other than labor and 
capital. For consistency with the linear homogeneity of C with respect to w, these 
subcomponents of the overall cost function are assumed to be homogeneous of degree one 
with respect to w1 and w2, as appropriate. Separating the cost function allows us to ensure 
that the elasticity of cost (value added) with respect to our technical regulation variables 
derived from the first component (C1) is unaffected by the presence of the second 
component (C2). This cost elasticity can be written as3 
sC
C
s
s
C
s ln/ln
1
1
1

 .      (3) 
Our specification of a short-run variable cost is a translog function. This translog 
function allows a flexible second-order approximation to a cost structure depending on 
output, input prices, and other factors, including technical regulations. The specification of 
costs for firm i is as follows: 
                                                 
2 In our specific case, the separability condition is expressed as 
 0
/),;,(
/),;,( 







K
L
j wzsywC
wzsywC
w
, KLj  ,  or  0
),;,(
),;,( 







zsywK
zsywL
w j
, KLj  , . 
3 When the technical regulation variables are of a binary type, we have 
1 1 1 1( , ;1, ) ( , ;0, )s C y w z C y w z   . 
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(4) 
Here, C  denotes value added (cost of labor and capital, referred to as production costs 
hereinafter), wL denotes the wage rate, wK denotes the unit price of capital, y denotes sales 
as a measure of output, and s denotes the firm-specific measure of technical regulations. 
The variables zn and zc denote industry-specific and country-specific factors, respectively, 
that affect firm costs. We use industry and country dummies to control for these effects.  
This translog cost function is estimated jointly with an equation for the share of 
labor cost in production costs: 
ln ln lnLi L LL Li LK Ki Ly i Ls i iS w w y s           .   (5) 
We eliminate the capital-share equation from the estimation because it is fully determined 
by the constraints below. Note that in writing these equations, we have imposed the 
required symmetry in cross-variable coefficients. Furthermore, the linear homogeneity 
condition imposes the following constraints: 
1 KL   
0 LKKK          (6) 
0 LKLL   
0 KyyL   
0 KsLs   
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Equations (4) and (5) are estimated jointly in an iterative three-stage least squares 
procedure (I3SLS), subject to the constraints in the system of equations (6). In addition to 
consistency and asymptotic efficiency, the I3SLS procedure guarantees identical translog 
cost parameters irrespective of which share equation is dropped (Berndt and Wood, 1975). 
The parameters for the dropped equation can be recovered by using the symmetry condition 
and the conditions in the system of equations (6). 
From equation (4), we can calculate the direct elasticity of production costs with 
respect to foreign standards as lnds s ss is    , which varies with the level of technical 
regulations. We are also interested in the impact of the standards on factor demands. The 
coefficient Ls  in the system of equations (6) measures the bias toward labor use (impact 
on labor share) from an increase in foreign technical regulations ( lnLs L LsS s    ), 
and the bias toward capital use, ( lnKs K KsS s     ). The need to satisfy these technical 
regulations could effectively generate an overall increase in costs, along with a bias in 
factor use toward either labor or capital.   
In addition to the direct elasticity of cost, we can calculate the total elasticity of cost 
with respect to a change in the stringency of technical regulations while accounting for 
impacts on factor use: 
sCS ln
~ln   =  iysKiKsLiLsisss ywws lnlnlnln   . (7) 
We use the binary variable as an instrument for technical regulations due to its 
possible endogeneity (a firm with greater productivity or cost efficiency is more willing to 
or capable of complying with technical regulations). The instrumental variables include 
dummy variables for a request to implement measures regarding chemical substances in the 
firm’s products, the status of acquisition of either ISO 9001 or ISO 14001 certification, and 
the experience of difficulty in procuring inputs. The question for the first instrumental 
variable is “Have you ever needed or been asked to implement measures regarding 
chemical substances in your products? Examples include the testing of products, changing 
inputs to reduce or eliminate certain chemicals, and providing information about chemicals 
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contained in your products since 2000” The question for the second variable is “Do you 
have any internationally recognized certificates such as ISO and, if so, which ones?” The 
question for the last variable is “Have you ever experienced difficulty in procuring inputs in 
order to meet chemical regulations/private requirements?” The criteria for selecting these 
instruments will be discussed in the subsequent subsection. 
 
3.2. Export analysis  
We now move to the estimation approach for the effect of technical regulations on 
various measures of export performance of firms, namely the firm’s entry into export 
markets, the number of export markets, and the export amount.  
We begin by considering the firm’s entry into export markets. A binary variable is 
given the value one when the firm exports to at least one foreign country and zero 
otherwise. A probit model is used to estimate the effect of technical regulations, s, along 
with other regressors. We then focus on the number of export markets as a measure of 
export diversification (we refer to this as the extensive margin in keeping with the 
literature). This model allows us to examine whether meeting RoHS or REACH will offer 
opportunities for the firm to export to a greater variety of markets. Since we are dealing 
with an ordered dependent variable, an ordered probit model is used for this estimation. We 
focus on the amount of a firm’s exports as a measure of the magnitude of exports instead of 
entry or count of markets in order to capture the intensity of exports. We refer to this as the 
intensive margin. Since the ordered probit estimation addresses market diversification, a 
complementary measure of export intensity would be (the logarithm of) the average export 
amount per market instead of the total export amount. The total amount reflects both the 
extensive and intensive margins. It is also common in the literature to estimate the intensive 
margin model using the Heckman sample selection model while taking the sample selection 
into account. This sample selection is represented by the above probit model corresponding 
to the extensive margin, as is typical.  
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We also admit the possibility of endogeneity of the RoHS and REACH variables in 
the export analysis because exporting firms are expected to face these regulations and are 
thus more inclined to comply with them. Thus, these probit models for export regime are 
estimated using the instrumental variable probit (IV probit) model. The same instrumental 
variables as the production analysis are used. They are selected based on the major tests to 
qualify instrumental variables, namely, Cragg-Donald statistic for weak instrumental 
variable, the Hansen J statistic for overidentifying restriction, the Kleibergen-Paap rank 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) statistic for underidentification, and the Wu-Hausman statistic 
for exogeneity of instruments. These tests are conducted based on the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) as some of the tests are not available for the IV probit model. It is not 
guaranteed that the instrumental variables selected based on the export regime regression 
will apply to the regression for the number of the export markets, for the export amount, or 
for the cost function, but we use the same set of instrumental variables throughout the 
production and export analysis in order to maintain the integrity of the analyses. 
Fortunately, these instruments satisfy these tests for most of the regression models.  
 
3.3. Analysis of global value chains  
 The role of global value chains in promoting compliance with RoHS\REACH 
regulations is analyzed using a probit regression. We are particularly interested in whether 
the positive effect of global value chains remains even though the firm is a non-exporter or 
upstream supplier who is unlikely to be subject to a direct request from buyers in importing 
countries to comply with those regulations. We can therefore examine the indirect effect of 
quality and safety management through the supply chain. This kind of analysis is best 
executed by introducing an interaction term for the exporter or upstream (or downstream) 
dummies with a dummy for a global value chain. 
 
4. Data 
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4.1. Survey in Malaysia 
The data for Malaysia were collected in the Malaysian state of Penang from 2012 to 
20134. Penang was chosen because of its large agglomeration of industries, with many of 
the targeted firms located in the area. The project was also endorsed by the government of 
Penang, as the state government recognized the importance of the issue. The actual survey 
was conducted by PE Research of Malaysia.  
Our questionnaire comprised four sections: 1) basic information, 2) input 
procurement and certificates, 3) chemical management, and 4) export status. Surveyed 
firms were sampled from those firms recorded in the Penang Industrial Census of 2011, 
which collected data on 2,116 firms, of which 1,898 were manufacturers and 218 were 
service firms. Beginning in November, 2012, questionnaires were sent to 732 of these firms, 
and the questionnaires were followed up with phone calls. We received replies from 374 
firms, giving us a response rate of approximately 51%5. From the manufacturing industries 
346 firms were chosen, while 23 firms were taken from the service sectors. We targeted 
those sectors for which the management of chemicals contained in products was likely to be 
necessary. The share of small and medium enterprises, here defined as fewer than 200 
employees, was 83.4%, or 308 of the chosen firms. Among the chosen firms, 72.6% (268) 
were 100% locally owned, and 18.7% (69) firms were 100% foreign-owned firms; the 
remaining 32 firms were joint ventures between local and foreign owners. 
 
4.2. Survey in Vietnam 
The data for Vietnam were collected from throughout the entire country in 2011 and 
2012. In Vietnam the survey was conducted by the Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry. The population consisted of firms in operation according to the General 
                                                 
4 The data were collected under the IDE-JETRO research project “Impact of product-related environmental 
regulations on international trade and technological spillovers through supply chain in Asia”.  
5  The authors wish to thank the local governments, Invest Penang and Penang industrial associations, 
Federation of Malaysian manufacturers (FMM) in the Northern Region and the association of companies in 
the free zones (FREPENCA) for endorsing our research project and also those firms who kindly filled out our 
form. 
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Department of Taxation. Target firms included both those in manufacturing and those in 
commerce sectors where the management of chemicals in products is an issue. Of the 
15,358 firms in the population, survey forms were sent to 11,978 firms across all provinces. 
A response rate of 8.8% (1055 firms) was obtained. Domestic firms account for 67.4% of 
respondents (710 firms), foreign direct investment (FDI) firms for 31.8% (335 firms), and 
state-owned enterprises for 0.9% (9 firms). Among respondents, 57.6% were small and 
medium enterprises, defined here as those with fewer than 300 employees.  
 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
The survey focuses on a variety of industries in Malaysia and Vietnam. The 
industries studied and the count of firms can be found in Table 1. Note that the number of 
samples will be limited to those that are used in the subsequent empirical analysis 
hereinafter. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in the cost and export 
analyses. First, we describe the variables used in the cost analysis. The average value added 
cost and sales are greater in Malaysia than in Vietnam. In Malaysia, we find that the wage 
rate and unit price of capital are higher. We define global value chains as networks of firms 
that procure inputs from various countries and sell the resulting products globally, such as 
automotive products, electronics, and garments. Firms were asked whether they supplied 
their main products to global supply chains. In Malaysia, more firms were integrated into 
global value chains. The number of firms complying with RoHS and REACH is also far 
greater in Malaysia. The survey also asked firms whether they were able to meet EU RoHS 
and REACH standards along with other regulations and requirements.6 
We next describe the variables used in the export analysis that were not used in the 
cost analysis. The fraction of firms exporting to any foreign country is quite similar 
between Malaysia (69%) and Vietnam (62%). However, the fraction of firms exporting to 
EU countries is greater in Vietnam (33%) than in Malaysia (25%). The average export 
                                                 
6 We assume that non-response implies non-compliance so as to conserve a loss of samples due to missing 
data. 
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amount per market in Malaysia is slightly more than twice that in Vietnam. The number of 
years since the firm was established is greater in Malaysia, perhaps reflecting the country’s 
earlier economic growth and industrialization. The average number of employees is smaller 
for Malaysia perhaps reflecting its tendency for greater capital intensity. The fraction of 
multinational enterprises is greater in Vietnam. The number of years since the firm’s main 
product was first produced and the type of company’s business registration form are used 
for the exclusion restriction in the Heckman sample selection model.  
 
5. Results 
5.1. Production analysis  
The cost function was run jointly with the labor share equation under alternative 
specifications. Instrumental variables were used for RoHS and REACH to mitigate the 
effects of endogeneity. The predicted value of RoHS (or REACH) from the ordinary least 
squares (known as the linear probability model) of the reduced-form regression (a model 
with instruments and exogenous variables as regressors is used in place of the original 
RoHS/REACH dummy. The parameter estimates with respect to the translog model are 
presented in Table 3. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The equation 
includes industry and country fixed effects. The fit of each model is good based on adjusted 
R-squared coefficients. We examine local concavity in input prices and positivity of input 
shares for the translog model according to procedures as described by Berndt and Wood 
(1975). Our translog cost function is found to satisfy these conditions.  
The results are presented in Table 3. The coefficients for both the RoHS and 
REACH variables are positive and significant. This indicates that the direct effect of RoHS 
and REACH is significant and indicates increased variable production costs due to 
compliance. According to the translog model, cost increases due to RoHS and REACH are 
57.3% and 73.1% of total (labor and capital) costs, respectively.  
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When we consider that our estimate concerns only labor and capital costs, we find 
that additional cost variables may be necessary. These could include cost of raw materials, 
intermediate inputs and other costs. Firms have also already incurred the initial setup costs 
for compliance with these regulations. We therefore see that the costs associated with 
RoHS and REACH compliance appear to be nontrivial.  
The effect of participating in a global value chain is not evident because the 
coefficients for the global value chains dummy are insignificant in the case of both RoHS 
and REACH. Firms are unlikely to enjoy a cost-saving effect from participation in global 
value chains. 
 
5.2. Export analysis 
In the export analysis, we focused on the firm’s entry to export markets, the number 
of export markets, and the export amount. The results for RoHS and REACH are presented 
in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. The first and second columns of these tables, respectively, 
show the results of the 2SLS and probit regressions used to examine whether compliance 
with RoHS and REACH improves the firm’s ability to access foreign markets generally. 
For the respective regressions, the third and fourth columns show whether compliance 
improves the firm’s ability to access EU markets specifically. The results indicate that both 
RoHS and REACH compliance increases the probability of entering both EU markets and 
foreign markets in general.  
The fifth column of these tables shows the results of the ordered probit estimation. 
We find that compliance with RoHS and REACH significantly increases the number of 
export markets. We can therefore conclude that compliance with RoHS and REACH helps 
firms to access a greater variety of countries. Thus, compliance with RoHS and REACH 
seems to signal the safety and quality of a firm’s products and to help the products gain 
acceptance in other markets.  
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The sixth and seventh columns of these tables show the results of a Heckman 
sample selection estimation examining the effect of compliance with RoHS and REACH on 
the average amount exported per market as a measure of the intensive margin.7 The results 
indicate that the (log) average export amount per export market does not significantly 
increase with compliance with RoHS or REACH. Thus, the major benefit of RoHS and 
REACH compliance is the diversification of export markets rather than an increase in 
export amount.  
There is no strong evidence that multinational enterprises or firms participating in 
global value chains tend to exhibit a greater propensity to export, diversity in export 
markets or scale of export.  
We also examine robustness of the full-sample results of the export analysis using 
the sub-sample of firms in the industries facing RoHS and REACH regulations. The results 
are largely the same as those of the full-sample estimation. The results are omitted in order 
to save space.  
Overall, compliance with RoHS and REACH provides firms with better access to 
export markets but the advantage of compliance with RoHS is likely to be found in 
accessing the EU market. This may indicate that EU REACH is more universal than EU 
RoHS. However, this finding seems to contradict our observation that RoHS-type 
regulations are more widely adopted than REACH-type regulations. Thus, detailed 
investigation about the dissimilarity of these regulations across countries would be 
necessary. 
5.3. Results of the global value chain analysis 
Finally, we analyze how global value chains might promote firms’ compliance with 
RoHS and REACH in consideration of the different status of firms in terms of export 
regime and their position in the supply chains. In Table 6, industries are categorized as 
upstream or downstream according to their typical position in the supply chain. Tables 7 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that the inverse mills ratios are insignificant in both tables, implying that sample selection 
is not severe enough to cause the biased coefficient estimators.  
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and 8 respectively show the result of probit regression for the effects of global value chains 
on RoHS and REACH compliance. Four different specifications are examined where 
dummy variables for Malaysia, export status, and participation in global value chains are 
included in all models. The first model has no additional regressors. The remaining models 
include either or both of the following interaction terms: global value chain dummy*export 
dummy and global value chain dummy*upstream industry dummy. Positive and significant 
effect of export regime and global value chain is observed in all models in the RoHS and 
REACH cases. This implies that exporting firms and firms participating global value chains 
tend to comply with RoHS and REACH. We also find that firms in Malaysia are more 
likely to comply with these regulations than those in Vietnam.  
The models with interaction terms, on the other hand, indicate that none of the 
interaction terms is significant. This implies that export status or position in the supply 
chain does not affect the way that global value chains encourage firms to comply with 
RoHS and REACH. This means that global value chains encourage even non-exporting 
firms and upstream suppliers to make efforts to comply with RoHS and REACH. Thus, the 
result suggests that supply chain management works effectively to ensure that participating 
firms satisfy the requirements of RoHS and REACH no matter where they are in the supply 
chain ladder. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This study used firm-level data to examine the impact of foreign chemical safety 
regulations such as RoHS and REACH on the production costs and export performance of 
firms in Malaysia and Vietnam. We found that in addition to the initial setup costs for 
compliance, EU RoHS and REACH implementation causes firms to incur additional 
variable production costs by requiring additional labor and capital expenditures of around 
57% and 73% of the variable costs, respectively. We also found that compliance with 
RoHS and REACH significantly increases the probability of export. A further finding was 
that compliance with EU RoHS and REACH helps firms enter a greater variety of countries. 
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On the other hand, it was found that RoHS and REACH compliance has no effect on the 
average export amount per market and that global value chains promote firms to comply 
with RoHS and REACH regulations irrespective of their export status or position in supply 
chain. 
In summary, RoHS and REACH impose on firms both initial setup costs and 
additional variable production costs. Compliance with these regulations can, however, 
reward firms with improved access to a greater number of export markets. The benefits of 
compliance may therefore exceed the additional costs although a direct comparison is not 
pursued in this paper due to the difference in the nature of the performance measures. 
Further investigation that focuses on differences in RoHS- and REACH-type chemical 
safety regulations across countries, in particular, between the EU and non-EU countries, is 
necessary to make useful recommendations for both exporting firms and regulating 
countries so as to avoid technical regulations that constitute unnecessary barriers to trade. 
Effort to harmonize regulations globally may increase economic benefits if they aim to 
achieve the same public goals and if cross-country differences in regulations are not 
significant.  
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Figure 1.  Malaysia's Exports (in billions of USD) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from World Development Indicators data 
 
Figure 2.  Vietnam's Exports (in billions of USD) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from World Development Indicators data 
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Table 1. Industries and number of firms included in the analysis 
Total Malaysia Vietnam RoHS REACH
Food products 48 21 27   
Beverages 6 4 2   
Textiles 24 7 17 x x 
Wearing apparel 99 6 93 x x 
Leather and related products 8 0 8 x x 
Wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture, 44 4 40 x x 
Paper and paper products 9 7 2 x x 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 9 7 2 x x 
Coke and refined petroleum products 2 1 1 x x 
Chemicals and chemical products 17 13 4 x x 
Basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparation 2 1 1 x x 
Rubber and plastics products 49 31 18 x x 
Other non-metallic mineral products 7 1 6 x x 
Basic metals 24 20 4 x x 
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 43 37 6 x x 
Computer, electronic and optical products 23 17 6 x x 
Electrical equipment 16 10 6 x x 
Machinery equipment 19 15 4 x x 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 5 2 3  x 
Other transport equipment 6 4 2  x 
Furniture 19 4 15 x x 
Other manufacturing 59 8 51 x x 
Wholesale and retail trade, and repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment including motor vehicles and 
motor-cycles 
11 3 8   
Others 46 0 46   
Source: Malaysia and Vietnam firm surveys. These counts are for the responses used in the empirical analyses. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis 
  Malaysia   Vietnam  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Cost analysis       
Value added cost (million USD) 220 15.9 36.5 391 3.19 5.20 
Sales (million USD) 220 23.7 50.0 391 5.21 7.60 
Wage rate (USD) 220 7129 8180 391 3153 11455 
Unit capital price (USD) 220 3.389 5.466 391 1.444 2.726 
Participation in global value chain 220 0.518 0.501 391 0.203 0.403 
RoHS compliance 220 0.341 0.475 391 0.092 0.289 
REACH compliance 220 0.241 0.429 391 0.092 0.289 
Export analysis       
Entry to export market 220 0.686 0.465 349 0.619 0.486 
Entry to EU market 220 0.250 0.434 349 0.327 0.470 
Number of export markets 220 2.700 2.609 349 1.613 2.031 
Average export per export market 
(million USD) 
154 6.47 18.5 175 2.70 4.58 
Number of years since the firm was 
established 
220 13.832 2.173 175 13.639 1.743 
Number of employees 220 19.568 12.747 349 10.444 9.539 
Multinational enterprise 220 151.1 287.0 349 504.2 1115.2 
Number of years since the main 
product was first produced 
220 0.218 0.414 349 0.292 0.455 
Financial stake 219 1.602 1.158 321 1.666 0.940 
Source: The authors’ calculations from Malaysia and Vietnam firm survey data.
27 
 
Table 3. Cost function estimation 
   RoHS REACH 
Variables translog translog
    
Constant 4.979***  5.024*** 
 (1.839)  (1.837) 
logy 0.419*  0.414* 
 (0.251)  (0.251) 
(logy)2 0.0280  0.0281 
 (0.0171)  (0.0171) 
logwL -0.0192  -0.0190 
 (0.0603)  (0.0603) 
logwK 1.019***  1.019*** 
 (0.0603)  (0.0603) 
(logwL)2 0.0663***  0.0663*** 
 (0.00260)  (0.00260) 
(logwK)2 0.0663***  0.0663*** 
 (0.00260)  (0.00260) 
logwLlogwK -0.0663***  -0.0663*** 
 (0.00260)  (0.00260) 
logwLlogy -0.0155***  -0.0156*** 
 (0.00361)  (0.00361) 
logwKlogy 0.0155***  0.0156*** 
 (0.00361)  (0.00361) 
s (= RoHS 0.574**  0.731** 
or REACH) (0.273)  (0.311) 
Global value -0.0460  -0.0669
chain (0.102)  (0.104)
Malaysia -0.529***  -0.486***
dummy (0.116)  (0.112)
   
Observations 569  569
R-squared 0.796  0.797
Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The instrumental variables for 
2SLS include dummy variables for the experience of a request to take chemical measures about chemical 
substances, the status of acquisition of either ISO 9001 or ISO 14001, and experience of a difficulty to 
procure inputs.  
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Table 4.  Results of export regressions for RoHS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Export entry Export entry Export entry 
to EU 
Export entry 
to EU 
Number of 
export 
markets 
log export 
amount 
 
Variables 2SLS IV probit 2SLS IV probit Ordered 
probit 
Heckman 
2nd stage 
Heckman 1st 
stage 
RoHS 0.531*** 0.382*** 0.564*** 0.504*** 1.725*** 0.263 1.753*** 
 (0.135) (0.0929) (0.132) (0.0797) (0.334) (0.955) (0.531) 
Firm age 0.00209 0.000387 0.00530** 0.00426** 0.00737 0.0149 0.0399** 
 (0.00213) (0.00192) (0.00209) (0.00197) (0.00514) (0.0130) (0.0186) 
wage 2.79e-06* 7.21e-06** 2.72e-06** 3.04e-06 4.90e-06** 1.70e-05 3.31e-05** 
 (1.67e-06) (3.37e-06) (1.15e-06) (3.23e-06) (2.49e-06) (1.17e-05) (1.61e-05) 
employment 8.90e-05*** 0.000714*** 0.000106*** 9.58e-05*** 0.000337*** 0.000331* 0.00338*** 
 (3.20e-05) (0.000139) (3.25e-05) (3.48e-05) (8.68e-05) (0.000189) (0.000660) 
MNE 0.161*** 0.0765 -0.0134 -0.00985 0.192 0.666** -0.658 
 (0.0502) (0.0499) (0.0591) (0.0424) (0.124) (0.328) (0.877) 
Global value 0.0798 0.0307 0.0135 -8.95e-05 0.259** -0.0515 0.119 
chain (0.0568) (0.0509) (0.0594) (0.0482) (0.131) (0.344) (0.221) 
Malaysia dummy -0.0910 -0.0511 -0.278*** -0.243*** 0.0567 0.260 -0.215 
 (0.0624) (0.0552) (0.0538) (0.0555) (0.143) (0.399) (0.257) 
Years of production       -0.0460** 
       (0.0188) 
Ownership (100% domestic        -1.119 
firm)       (0.800) 
Ownership (partial foreign        -0.131 
ownership)       (0.447) 
Constant     4.592*** 14.93*** 0.102 
     (0.445) (0.801) (0.790) 
Inverse mills ratio      -2.354***  
      (0.524)  
Uncentered R2 0.154  0.077     
Cragg-Donald statistics for 
weak instrument 
31.264***  20.461***     
Hansen J statistics for 
overidentifying restriction 
3.982  4.494     
Kleibergen-Paap rank LM for 
underidentification 
74.013***  53.081***     
Wu-Hausman statistics for 
exogeneity of instruments 
21.933***  16.096***     
Observations 463 441 463 443 463 444 444 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See the footnote of Table 3 for the 
selection of the instrumental variables. 
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Table 5. Results of export regressions for REACH 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Export entry Export entry Export entry 
to EU 
Export entry 
to EU 
Number of 
export 
markets 
log export 
amount 
 
Variables 2SLS IV probit 2SLS IV probit Ordered 
probit 
Heckman 
2nd stage 
Heckman 1st 
stage 
REACH 0.696*** 0.522*** 0.733*** 0.613*** 2.250*** 0.242 2.319*** 
 (0.183) (0.118) (0.193) (0.0905) (0.448) (1.276) (0.713) 
Firm age -0.000301 -0.00125 0.00280 0.00171 -0.000364 0.0143 0.0315* 
 (0.00237) (0.00201) (0.00250) (0.00207) (0.00565) (0.0142) (0.0186) 
wage 3.28e-06 7.42e-06** 3.23e-06 3.14e-06 6.51e-06** 1.71e-05 3.48e-05** 
 (2.08e-06) (3.30e-06) (2.20e-06) (2.95e-06) (2.56e-06) (1.19e-05) (1.61e-05) 
employment 8.73e-05*** 0.000707*** 0.000104*** 8.30e-05** 0.000331*** 0.000331* 0.00339*** 
 (3.21e-05) (0.000143) (3.38e-05) (3.36e-05) (8.77e-05) (0.000189) (0.000659) 
MNE 0.150*** 0.0688 -0.0239 -0.0161 0.158 0.665** -0.686 
 (0.0531) (0.0504) (0.0560) (0.0410) (0.126) (0.330) (0.877) 
Global value 0.0589 0.00645 -0.00758 -0.0212 0.192 -0.0446 0.0460 
chain (0.0601) (0.0534) (0.0634) (0.0482) (0.138) (0.363) (0.233) 
Malaysia dummy -0.0590 -0.0317 -0.244*** -0.193*** 0.161 0.281 -0.107 
 (0.0602) (0.0537) (0.0635) (0.0544) (0.140) (0.385) (0.249) 
Years of production       -0.0457** 
       (0.0188) 
Ownership (100% domestic        -1.107 
firm)       (0.799) 
Ownership (partial foreign        -0.125 
ownership)       (0.447) 
Constant      14.95*** 0.195 
      (0.788) (0.790) 
Inverse mills ratio      -2.359***  
      (0.524)  
Uncentered R2 0.112  -0.021     
Cragg-Donald statistics for 
weak instrument 20.461***  20.461*** 
    
Hansen J statistics for 
overidentifying restriction 4.494  4.319 
    
Kleibergen-Paap rank LM for 
underidentification 53.081***  53.081*** 
    
Wu-Hausman statistics for 
exogeneity of instruments 18.273***  17.128*** 
    
Observations 463 441 463 443 463 444 444 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See the footnote of Table 3 for the 
selection of the instrumental variables. 
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Table 6. Categorization of upstream/downstream industries (by production processes) 
 
Number 
of firms RoHS REACH
UPSTREAM INDUSTRIES    
Leather and related products 8 x x 
Wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture 44 x x 
Paper and paper products 9 x x 
Chemicals and chemical products 17 x x 
Basic metals 24 x x 
Wholesale and retail trade, and repair and installation of machinery and 
equipment including motor vehicles and motor-cycles 
11   
DOWNSTREAM INDUSTRIES    
Food products 48   
Beverages 6   
Textiles 24 x x 
Wearing apparel 99 x x 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 9 x x 
Coke and refined petroleum products 2 x x 
Basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparation 2 x x 
Rubber and plastics products 49 x x 
Other non-metallic mineral products 7 x x 
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 43 x x 
Computer, electronic and optical products 23 x x 
Electrical equipment 16 x x 
Machinery equipment 19 x x 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 5  x 
Other transport equipment 6  x 
Furniture 19 x x 
Other manufacturing 59 x x 
Others 46   
Note: This categorization is based on a typical position of industries in the supply chain. 
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Table 7.  Probit regression for the effect of global value chain on RoHS compliance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables  
     
Export 0.356** 0.422* 0.346** 0.412* 
 (0.172) (0.220) (0.171) (0.220) 
Global value chain 0.786*** 0.912*** 0.856*** 0.983*** 
 (0.162) (0.322) (0.178) (0.332) 
Global value chain *  -0.168  -0.168 
Export  (0.363)  (0.361) 
Global value chain *   -0.314 -0.314 
Upstream   (0.386) (0.385) 
Malaysia 0.618*** 0.613*** 0.617*** 0.612*** 
 (0.192) (0.193) (0.191) (0.193) 
Constant -2.074*** -2.110*** -2.076*** -2.113*** 
 (0.353) (0.374) (0.354) (0.375) 
Observations 467 467 467 467 
Pseudo R-squared 0.234 0.235 0.236 0.236 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 8.  Probit regression for the effect of global value chain on REACH compliance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Full sample 
          
Export 0.612*** 0.622*** 0.615*** 0.624*** 
 (0.201) (0.240) (0.201) (0.240) 
Global value chain 0.778*** 0.797** 0.758*** 0.774** 
 (0.172) (0.375) (0.184) (0.375) 
Global value chain * -0.0240 -0.0215 
Export (0.407) (0.407) 
Global value chain * 0.104 0.103 
Upstream (0.430) (0.429) 
Malaysia 0.437** 0.436** 0.438** 0.437** 
 (0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.203) 
Constant -2.394*** -2.400*** -2.397*** -2.403*** 
 (0.457) (0.483) (0.459) (0.485) 
Observations 449 449 449 449 
Pseudo R-squared 0.222 0.222 0.223 0.223 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
